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12/4/2014
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Sony Hackers Knew Details Of Sony's Entire IT Infrastructure

While trying to simultaneously recover from a data breach and a wiper attack, Sony watches attackers publish maps and credentials for everything from production servers to iTunes accounts.

UPDATED Dec. 5, 4 p.m. ET: Whoever they are, the attackers who breached Sony used wiper malware to destroy Sony's systems, and are slowly disclosing stacks of stolen Sony confidential data and intellectual property. And they knew everything there was to know about Sony's IT infrastructure.

Security researchers have discovered that the wiper malware -- called Destover by some, WIPALL by others -- contained hard-coded names of servers inside Sony's network and the credentials to access them. Further, the attackers themselves released a new set of 11,000 files last night that include, as one reporter explained it, "everything needed to manage the day-to-day [IT] operations at Sony."

Sony has been trying to recover from the wiper attacks since they began Nov. 24. Employees' client machines all froze up and locked behind a wallpaper, emblazoned with a red skull, claiming that the company had been pwned by the Guardians of Peace (GOP) because it had not complied with GOP's demands, and warning that the company's secrets were about to be spilled.

The wallpaper showed on Sony machines.
The wallpaper showed on Sony machines.

True to their word, the attackers began uploading sensitive Sony data to Pastebin. The leaked files contained both corporate data and intellectual property. The files also included full copies of Sony movies that have not yet been released and a script for a new TV pilot by the creator of Breaking Bad. Employee salaries, performance reviews, and criminal background checks were exposed. Plus, according to Identity Finder, over 47,000 unique Social Security numbers were exposed, including those of current and former Sony employees and celebrities, including Sylvester Stallone, Judd Apatow, and Rebel Wilson. Many of those SSNs appeared in multiple documents -- some showed it up in more than 400 places -- so altogether, there were over 1.1 million copies of SSNs.

Meanwhile, the wiper software began destroying all Sony's internal systems. The FBI released a flash alert this week, which did not explicitly mention Sony, but warned of a wiper malware that "has the capability to overwrite a victim host’s master boot record (MBR) and all data files. The overwriting of the data files will make it extremely difficult and costly, if not impossible, to recover the data using standard forensic methods.”

Recovering from a data breach and a large-scale system destruction at the same time is exceptionally complex. Complicating matters further is that the treasure trove of data leaked yesterday includes everything attackers would need to compromise Sony all over again, in the manner of their choosing. The data includes RSA SecurID tokens, global network maps detailing databases and enterprise servers, and access credentials/files for QA servers, staging servers, production servers, routers, switches, load balancers, FTP servers, email accounts, and third-party applications -- including UPS, FedEx, McAfee, Google Analytics, iTunes, Sprint, and Verizon.

So, how does a company recover? Burn whatever's left and build something entirely new and different?

"Shut it all down," says Jody Brazil of FireMon. He says that throwing away the entire company isn't a solution. But for now, he recommends shutting down all external communications and all Web access entirely (and bringing it back slowly and carefully), resetting all passwords, instituting change control, doing a massive assessment of all systems, and aiming to get business running appropriately again in weeks, not days. "It's a very drastic approach," he says, "but the right one."

Sony's media relations department did not answer its phone or respond to emailed requests for comment today. They are working with law enforcement and Mandiant on the investigation.

"They're in a really bad situation," says Jaime Blasco of AlienVault, which has examined the wiper.

"From the samples we obtained," Blasco says, "we can say the attackers knew the internal network from Sony, since the malware samples contain hard-coded names of servers inside Sony’s network and even credentials -- usernames and passwords -- that the malware uses to connect to systems inside the network."

In other words, the wiper was customized for Sony's environment after the attackers obtained all the detailed information about the Sony IT infrastructure.

How did they obtain that information? Either they conducted a staged attack -- compromising the network, poking around, obtaining credentials, escalating privileges, etc. -- or they were given the information by an insider.

Blasco isn't willing to guess, but in a Nov. 25 interview with The Verge, someone claiming to be one of the attackers from the Guardians of Peace said "Sony doesn't lock their doors, physically, so we worked with other staff with similar interests to get in."

The source also told The Verge, "We Want equality [sic]. Sony doesn't. It's an upward battle."

So who are the we they name?

There has been a great deal of speculation that the attackers are based in North Korea -- either nation-state actors or hacktivists -- who were possibly motivated to attack Sony to protest its newly released movie The Interview -- a comedy about two American entertainers being hired by the CIA to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. There were even reports stating that Sony was going to confirm any minute now that North Korea was behind the attack. However, Sony responded to those reports Wednesday saying that they were "not accurate." 

According to Blasco, "The malware samples we have found talk to IP addresses in Italy, Singapore, Poland, the US, Thailand, Bolivia, and Cyprus -- probably hacked systems or VPN/proxies that the attackers use to hide the origin. We also found the attackers were using the Korean language in the systems they used to compile some of the pieces of malware we have found.”

The use of Korean in the compiler, says Blasco, is "the only technical indicator" of a North Korean-based attack, "and that info can be faked."

Kaspersky and Symantec, however, say that there are other reasons to make the connection to North Korea. Symantec reports that the Destover wiper uses a command-and-control server that was also used by the Volgmer Trojan, and shares techniques and components with Jokra. Both Jokra and Volgmer were used in attacks against South Korea. 

Sara Peters is Senior Editor at Dark Reading and formerly the editor-in-chief of Enterprise Efficiency. Prior that she was senior editor for the Computer Security Institute, writing and speaking about virtualization, identity management, cybersecurity law, and a myriad ... View Full Bio

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ODA155
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ODA155,
User Rank: Ninja
12/22/2014 | 9:38:50 AM
Re: Just throwing jet fuel on the fire
@Joe Stanganelli,... First, I love the disclaimer... ad you do make good points too. Whoever, the biggest problem that I see coming out of this is the ONLY point of view is that Sony is the victim, and because that's all the media and "talking heads" seem to be interested in, which I guess is true when you look at it from the view of "who was hacked". But as I have said in other places, Sony has allot to answer for, they've been hacked at lease three times in 5 years, but that hasn't been discussed, which begs the question, "just how easy is it to gain access to that network?".

In my opinion this event, because it involves North Korea, we should be looking at our privately owned (national) infrastructure of public utilities, water, electric... other power generation and banking. It's been proved many times over that some of these critical systems are open to the Internet, if not vulnerable to a dedicated script-kiddy. We (the US) invented STUXNET... Duqu... Flame and possibly others that we haven't heard about (yet). I don't know about you but there is no way that I can believe that America is the only "Nation State" with this capability, we're just the only ones whose been caught using it.  We're wasting time.

 
Joe Stanganelli
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Joe Stanganelli,
User Rank: Ninja
12/22/2014 | 7:02:14 AM
Re: Just throwing jet fuel on the fire
One thing that's often overlooked (of course, it has rarely sought to be enforced except when sexting is involved) when it comes to reporting on hacked/leaked info is the issue of intellectual property.

To report on a few facets, for instance, of Amy Pascal's emails would not be an IP violation, but it would potentially be a copyright infringement to copy the emails wholesale (as the hackers have done).

 

(Disclaimer: The above is provided for informational, educational, and/or entertainment purposes only. Neither this nor other posts here constitute legal advice or the creation, implication, or confirmation of an attorney-client relationship. For actual legal advice, personally consult with an attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction.)
Joe Stanganelli
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Joe Stanganelli,
User Rank: Ninja
12/22/2014 | 6:59:12 AM
Re: "Shut it all down"
@ODA: I wasn't endorsing it; I was merely pointing out the fact that it happens.
aws0513
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aws0513,
User Rank: Ninja
12/15/2014 | 12:02:50 PM
Just throwing jet fuel on the fire
Sony is apparently riding on a different rail now.
Sony just issued a cease and desist letter to three different major news media outlets telling them to stop reporting on the content of the hacked information.
(I'm sure you can find the details behind this latest development on several news media outlets by now.)

To me...  this is not a good method for conducting damage control for this kind of situation. 
It will simply call more vultures to the feast.

It does raise the question on what rights the press has with "non-regulatory" exfiltrated content released by hackers and what rights the victims of such attacks may have for the same content.

I know this isn't a 100% IT security concern, but it does feed in to damage control and contingency plans for fluid situations where non-regulatory data is involved.
ODA155
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ODA155,
User Rank: Ninja
12/15/2014 | 9:57:49 AM
Re: "Shut it all down"
So... in affect, it's OK to be mad (as we should) when the NSA breaks the law and it's also OK to ask them to break the law when it suits us?
Joe Stanganelli
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Joe Stanganelli,
User Rank: Ninja
12/14/2014 | 11:44:39 PM
Re: "Shut it all down"
Sure -- but information the NSA garners appears to have been/be being used for law enforcement purposes.  So the semantics/pedantics don't really make much difference here, yes?
ODA155
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ODA155,
User Rank: Ninja
12/13/2014 | 10:57:00 AM
Re: "Shut it all down"
Collaboration and actual enforcement are two separate things... wouldn't you agree?
Joe Stanganelli
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Joe Stanganelli,
User Rank: Ninja
12/12/2014 | 8:52:48 PM
Re: "Shut it all down"
Point of information: The Snowden docs etc. revealed that the NSA does collaborate and give information from their SIGINT ops to other actual domestic law enforcement agencies, like the DEA.
ODA155
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ODA155,
User Rank: Ninja
12/9/2014 | 12:52:22 PM
Re: "Shut it all down"
@Technocrati,... "This is the real truth of it all. It is blatantly evident that most enterprise security is well behind the abilities of serious hackers."

I disagree somewhat to that statement because while it is true that security department are "behind", I don't think it's because of a lack of expertise. In my experience I would argue that security is naturally behind because a) you don't know if it works until it's been tested in the real world, in other words you don't know what the next thing is going to be so you do the usuaul protective things try to plan for what is being reported and react if you need to. Then b), security will always lag behind unless someone can make a really compelling case for spending what it REALLY takes or someone in management understands and gets it. The business makes the money and security spends money, it doesn't make a dime, we're takers and if you haven't tried to convience management to spend money and resources on something that you cannot prove or justify is going to happen tomorrow, fuhgeddaboudit, they'll keep blowing you off until "next quarter", in other words... fuhgeddaboudit.
Technocrati
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Technocrati,
User Rank: Ninja
12/8/2014 | 4:53:43 PM
Re: insider?

"...I wonder if we'll ever find out what really happened here."

 

 

I don't know that that really matters.   The who dun it question really does not address the issue of why supposed "high end security" is constantly being breeched. 

Companies seem to be fooling themselves and "security" is quickly becoming a question of just how much data and sensative information you want to expose to risk, that is if you have the choice.

Page 1 / 4   >   >>
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