Kaspersky researchers say at least three other projects besides Duqu and Stuxnet were created with Tilded -- named for the developers' penchant for using file names that start with a tilde symbol and the letter "d" -- including a spyware module that dates back to 2007 and 2008. But still no real evidence points to the actors behind Stuxnet, Duqu, or the other attacks using the Tilded, the researchers say.
Meanwhile, other likely exploits have yet to be discovered from the same platform, researchers say.
"We don't know who the attackers are, but what we can say from all the evidence is that they are quite well-organized ... we're talking about professional software developers working in four or five different teams and each team taking care of one of the modules," says Costin Raiu, director of the global research and analysis team at Kaspersky Lab. And their focus appears to entail sabotage of some type, he says, with the support of a nation-state and with the goal of cyberespionage.
But neither Kaspersky nor Symantec, which have led much of the research into Stuxnet and Duqu, can confirm in their research the million-dollar question of just who is behind the two attack campaigns, despite heavy speculation that it's the handiwork of the U.S. and Israel attempting to derail Iran's nuclear enrichment program.
Security expert Tom Parker says while Duqu and Stuxnet could be related, that doesn't mean they are necessarily the same operation. "The missions of Stuxnet and Duqu were different: One was reconnaissance [Duqu], and the other was a proactive agent [Stuxnet]," says Parker, chief technology officer at FusionX. "I don't think there is any information technology analysis of the similarities in the code to suggest that [they are from the same operation]."
And Don Jackson, senior security researcher at Dell Secureworks, says while Kaspersky's new research basically reinforces his theory that Stuxnet and Duqu were written with the same kit, it doesn't prove they were written by the same authors. He argues that code-sharing is not as effective in attribution in malware nowadays due to the wide availability of crimeware kits. "You need to focus more on the operational parameters," he says. "What was in common with the two is that they were generated by the same kit. Now we have a name for that kit," Jackson says.
That doesn't necessarily mean they go together, however, he says. Jackson contends that Duqu was not used for reconnaissance for Stuxnet, a conclusion that Kaspersky has drawn and Symantec has suggested. "I don't believe Duqu was used as reconnaissance for Stuxnet. In fact, based on our understanding of all the findings to date, it's contraindicated," he says.
For one thing, Duqu appears to be younger than Stuxnet, according to Jackson. "If the development of the Tilded kit follows the general evolutionary pattern of development of software in general, and of practically all similar malware kits more specifically, then Duqu is younger than Stuxnet based on the common code. This is supported by analysis of incident time lines and other artifacts, such as compiler and code-signing time stamps," etc., he says.
Liam O Murchu, manager of operations for Symantec Security Response, says while Stuxnet and Duqu use the same code base, the real link is the loader file that Kaspersky studied: It's one file on the disk of an infected machine that is not encrypted. And while Murchu can't reveal details about Duqu victims, he says Duqu was targeting similar types of companies, possibly for a future Stuxnet attack. "I can say that all the companies Duqu [hit] had something useful to the business of Stuxnet," Murchu says.
And it's likely the attackers behind Duqu and Stuxnet are still operating under different attack campaigns. "They are likely still operating and reconfiguring and recompiling it to avoid security products or researchers," he says. "There could be attacks going on right now that we are not aware of."
[Lessons learned from the Stuxnet-Duqu link. See Four Takeaways From The Stuxnet-Duqu Connection.]
Meanwhile, there are several missing pieces to the Stuxnet and Duqu puzzle. First, there's "Stars," a cyberattack the Iranian government claims hit its nuclear facility in April. Researchers at first dismissed the news as either a hoax or common malware, according to Kaspersky's Raiu, but later discovered that Duqu contains a photo showing the collision of two galaxies, indicating a possible connection with Stars.
"We think that many targets in Iran were specific versions of Duqu, and that may be one of the missing pieces of the puzzle," he says.
Another question is that one of the components for the Duqu command-and-control (C&C) servers was written in a programming language that the researchers had never seen before. "It was a very curious procedural language .. we don't know why they chose to write it in a different language, and we don't know what this language is," Raiu says. "Solving this [may] help us understand who created the communication module, or if different groups don't know about one another," for example, he says.
Still a mystery, too, is how the Duqu attackers hacked the systems they used as C&C servers. "All of the computers belong to people and organizations unrelated to Duqu and had been hacked," he says. "We need a good explanation of how they accessed them."
Have a comment on this story? Please click "Add Your Comment" below. If you'd like to contact Dark Reading's editors directly, send us a message.
| To upload an avatar photo, first complete your Disqus profile. | View the list of supported HTML tags you can use to style comments. | Please read our commenting policy. |
How Did They Get In? A Guide to Tracking Down The Source of an APT
If you think that your organization hasn't been affected by an advanced persistent threat, you probably haven't looked hard enough. Identifying that your organization is under attack is difficult enough; determining the scope of infiltration and damage presents a whole new level of challenge. To effectively protect against APTs, security pros will need to employ an arsenal of tools in a coordinated fashion, as well as develop new understandings of and approaches to system and data exploits. Here's a short and simple guide to this challenge.
Detecting and Defending Against Advanced Persistent Threats
APTs are a growing problem for enterprises big and small. Protecting your organization from these targeted threats
requires constant vigilance, ongoing employee training and a concerted effort to align security systems to address
every phase of an APT. Companies also need to develop a remediation and response plan if, despite best efforts, defenses are breached.
Smarter, Stealthier, Sneakier Malware
Increasingly sophisticated and targeted attacks are making it more difficult for organizations to detect
and defend against the latest malware. In this compendium of recent coverage from Dark Reading, you?ll get a look at some of the newest -- and most dangerous -- malware on the Web, and what you can do to stop it.
Other reports from the Advanced Threats Tech Center:
| Sponsored by: |
MOBILE SECURITY - Mapping an Ecosystem of Risk
This white paper highlights the various considerations for defending mobile applications-from the mobile application architecture itself to the myriad testing technologies needed to properly assess mobile applications risk.
Software Security Delivered in the Cloud
This Solution Guide details the automated, turnkey service that requires no special security assessment expertise. It details HP's market-leading static and dynamic analysis technologies that help organizations worldwide gain insight into the security state of their essential business applications.
SANS Mobility/BYOD Security Survey
This survey, which includes input from more than 500 IT professionals, explores how organizations are managing risk around their end user mobile devices as well as what level of policies and controls enterprises have around mobile usage.
Expert Guide to Application Security - Real-time Hybrid Analysis
Explore the next generation of hybrid security analysis - what it is, how it works, and its benefits. This white paper details how hybrid application security enables organizations to resolve critical software security issues faster and at a lower cost than any other available technology.
A Mainstay Partners Study: Does Application Security Pay?
Measuring the Business Impact of Software Security Assurance Solutions: a study of 17 organizations that implemented solutions from Fortify Software, combining industry research and benchmark analysis to identify, qualify, and quantify the full range of benefits seen from their SSA investments.
MORE NEWSFEED >>>