Earlier this week a security researcher posted nearly three dozen vulnerabilities in industrial control system software to a widely read security mailing list. The move has Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA) system operators scrambling, and the US CERT issuing warnings.The story, as covered by our Mathew J. Schwartz yesterday in his story, SCADA Attack Code Released For 35 Vulnerabilities, sums it up well: "The vulnerable systems include Siemens Tecnomatix FactoryLink 8.0.1.1473 (six vulnerabilities, though one is DOS-only), Iconics Genesis32 and Genesis64 10.51 (13 vulnerabilities), 7-Technologies IGSS -- Interactive Graphical SCADA System -- 9.00.00.11059 (8 vulnerabilities), and DATAC RealWin 2.1 (8 vulnerabilities). US-CERT's Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team released four related security bulletins.

Most of the detailed vulnerabilities involve buffer overflows and other threats which, according to experts cited by Wired News, pose little danger except the threat of a system crash. But there are at least two exceptions: The Siemens software can also be made to download a file, raising the possibility of a remote code execution attack. In addition, the IGSS software is vulnerable to arbitrary file execution.

"

The security of these industrial systems - which help to manage chemical, manufacturing, energy, and distribution networks - is critical. That goes without saying, and many have been decrying the security of SCADA systems for years. Researchers I've interviewed in recent months have said that not only are the SCADA systems themselves inherently full of flaws (and who could argue after this week's vulnerability dump?), but that operators also fail to keep these systems adequately segmented from the Internet, enforce encrypted access, or even use strong authentication.

Stuxnet, especially, highlighted the dangers of such complacency.

The current sad state of affairs with SCADA security reminds me the pre-Windows XP Service Pack 2 days - when dozens of operating system vulnerabilities and worms hammered the operating system. The inherently insecure operating system required one of the most aggressive security overhauls of any operating system before - or since - just to make the software marginally more secure.

This week's disclosure is another sign that shows SCADA developers are going to have to undergo a similar evolution if they're to be trusted. These systems are going to have to be poked, prodded, and fuzzed by these vendors. And, if they don't, expect more vulnerability dumps like the one we saw this week - and more Stuxnets. Hopefully, the worm won't be aimed at U.S. systems next time.

For my security and technology observations throughout the day, find me in Twitter @georgevhulme.