Dark Reading is part of the Informa Tech Division of Informa PLC

This site is operated by a business or businesses owned by Informa PLC and all copyright resides with them.Informa PLC's registered office is 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG. Registered in England and Wales. Number 8860726.

Target Ignored Data Breach Alarms
Oldest First  |  Newest First  |  Threaded View
<<   <   Page 2 / 3   >   >>
User Rank: Apprentice
3/15/2014 | 5:53:42 PM
Re: These stories all present misleading or incomplete data with sensational titles
hhendrickson274 said, "... these stories all present misleading or incomplete data with sensational titles..."
Enough information is already present for an informed judgment about the Target IT team response. To plead unlikely extenuating circumstances such as (1) the team was overwhelmed by the volume of alerts, and was unable to distinguish signal from noise, or (2) the team might have seen similar alarts, which were investigated (despite the overwhelming volume of alerts) and dismissed as probable false positives, or (3) any Russian IP address is not necessarily cause for suspicion, since "(we do not know why) they would feel outbound connections from their POS to a Russian based IP wouldn't be suspicious" is worthy of a press release from Target public relations.

The FireEye system did its job well enough, elevating the alerts to the attention of Target IT, which eliminates the "sheer overload" excuse. Likewise, if the administrator had turned off automated response, it was critical to forge a field-tested policy for dealing with such detections manually, and then follow it to the letter. As for a number of Russian IPs, that in itself carries enough negative freight to merit special consideration-- aside from the principle that any "strange" address merits investigation.

Target did none of these things. What Target did is typical of the "90-day Wonder" policy of generating new managers ex nihilo, an IT person placed in the job for reasons that have little to do with experience or competence. As the survival tactic of one lacking experience, that manager essentially bought a well-respected brand, and then tried to hide behind it-- blaming FireEye for what was a Target responsibility.

Any Target promotion of a favored, specific person over those with more skill and'or experience is also excruciating commentary on the politics of Target management, since it focuses on factors which have little or nothing to do with professionalism. Such "fast track" promotions insidiously kill incentive among staff to demonstrate responsibility and competence. Fast track staffing is also disingenuous to the extreme, a breach of trust between executive management and staff-- especially those who were told promotion is based on demonstrated effort, competence and experience.

With the extremely questionable managerial culture at Target, the only possible defense against a charge of deliberately risky behavior with customer accounts is "mistakes were made"-- an abject confession of incompetence. While every manager is entitled to on-the-job training, that training should ensure millions of customer credit cards and bank accounts are not also at risk.
User Rank: Apprentice
3/16/2014 | 9:19:13 PM
Deactivation of FireEye's Automatic Response
There's a reason this was done.  Over the years protection software has triggered false alarms and quarantined needed programs and libraries rendering either software or subsystems (like printing) inoperable.  The last thing you want is to have thousands of POS lanes die because an automated response, triggered by a false positive, removed an important program or library module.
User Rank: Apprentice
3/17/2014 | 9:02:21 AM
Re: Deactivation of FireEye's Automatic Response
Do you know what Target's procedure is when they see an alarm in the software, false or otherwise?  I would think that they have a policy in place to investigate the alarm to determine its validity. I know that things can move very slowly in the corporate world but this is the type of issue that most companies prepare for.
User Rank: Guru
3/17/2014 | 2:25:10 PM
Block botnets
Target IT dept fail many ways. 1) If Target blocked all connections to botnet centers, the malware could not send data out. 2) The HVAC vendor said they didn't monitor Target remotely, why did Target give them a corp/network account? 3) Target should not give that account full access to the POS. 4) Security,access auditing was ignored. 5) Ignored alarms. 6) POS should have a seperate network. Target tried to save money here.
User Rank: Apprentice
3/17/2014 | 5:33:00 PM
Re: Deactivation of FireEye's Automatic Response
They should respond manually.  If the product constantly cries wolf, either the alert config needs review or the product needs to be replaced.  If that's not an option then they should push the alerts to Splunk and mine the noise for credible events that correlate with other intrusion events (assumes firewalls and other stuff are pushed to Splunk).  My point was automated responses might be tolerated for devices that aren't customer facing but you do not want call center devices, bank ATMs or POS systems downed by a false alarm that automatically removes a vital component.

As a side note, I still don't understand why a POS system could have ANYTHING new installed on it outside of planned events.  They shoud use white list protection or an OS that won't run unsigned apps (like IOS, Android or Windows RT).
User Rank: Apprentice
3/17/2014 | 7:16:26 PM
It just keeps getting worse for Target. To now know they had the systems in place that could have stopped this breach if they just used the system correctly is unacceptable. This just goes to show you that the best systems are rendered useless id people don't use them correctly.
User Rank: Apprentice
3/18/2014 | 8:43:30 AM
Re: Deactivation of FireEye's Automatic Response
You would think that the POS terminals would be locked down as tightly as possible.  It's not like your cashiers should be installing anything on them but not knowing all the details it is possible that the application used the name of a Windows service or application.  
User Rank: Apprentice
3/18/2014 | 11:54:26 AM
Re: Deactivation of FireEye's Automatic Response
Locking them down assumes an OS security exploit was not used to install the malware.  I think it's been established Target's POS uses Windows.  I'll even go further and make an assumption that it's probably XP.

I'm not aware of any XP built-in solution to prevent a security hole being exploited to install malware.  If it's a remote attack vector, it'll typically involve a network service of some kind.  Most services generally have escalated privileges and if compromised, the hacker can almost always use them to gain root access.  

What Windows needs is a helper that monitors via read/write hooks and compares all file-system changes on system/software components with a dictionary made on the original system's image.  If anything is found out of spec, an alert is issued and the processes that use the corrupt image are terminated.  Further, such a helper also needs to scan DLLs and applications IN MEMORY to make sure they too are appropriate.  If not, the processes are terminated.  If an new process begins that's tied to an executable that's not part of the original image, it's terminated before it even finishes loading into memory.

Such products exist for XP and had they been using them, it would have been really tough to infect their POS systems even if a USB thumb drive was inserted.  Hackers would first have to figure out how to disable that software before exploiting the system.  Unfortunately this would require hacking the system so the protection mechanism can be hacked.  It's a chicken and egg scenario.  Certainly not foolproof but arguably difficult enough to perhaps convince them a company using such protection is not low hanging fruit.
User Rank: Apprentice
3/19/2014 | 4:04:28 PM
Happens far too often
Unfortunate, but the fact that they ignored the warning signs isn't a surprise. There is a dramatic need for a shift in culture. One would think the cost alone would be enough. On average attacks cost companies $11.6 million according to the 2013 HP Ponemon Cost of Cyber Crime report (http://www.hpenterprisesecurity.com/ponemon-study-2013).

Peter Fretty (j.mp/pfrettyhp)
User Rank: Apprentice
3/24/2014 | 12:03:15 PM
Re: Deactivation of FireEye's Automatic Response
I believe this solution exists (McAfee Solidcore)
<<   <   Page 2 / 3   >   >>

I Smell a RAT! New Cybersecurity Threats for the Crypto Industry
David Trepp, Partner, IT Assurance with accounting and advisory firm BPM LLP,  7/9/2021
Attacks on Kaseya Servers Led to Ransomware in Less Than 2 Hours
Robert Lemos, Contributing Writer,  7/7/2021
It's in the Game (but It Shouldn't Be)
Tal Memran, Cybersecurity Expert, CYE,  7/9/2021
Register for Dark Reading Newsletters
White Papers
Current Issue
The 10 Most Impactful Types of Vulnerabilities for Enterprises Today
Managing system vulnerabilities is one of the old est - and most frustrating - security challenges that enterprise defenders face. Every software application and hardware device ships with intrinsic flaws - flaws that, if critical enough, attackers can exploit from anywhere in the world. It's crucial that defenders take stock of what areas of the tech stack have the most emerging, and critical, vulnerabilities they must manage. It's not just zero day vulnerabilities. Consider that CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog lists vulnerabilitlies in widely used applications that are "actively exploited," and most of them are flaws that were discovered several years ago and have been fixed. There are also emerging vulnerabilities in 5G networks, cloud infrastructure, Edge applications, and firmwares to consider.
Flash Poll
Twitter Feed
Dark Reading - Bug Report
Bug Report
Enterprise Vulnerabilities
From DHS/US-CERT's National Vulnerability Database
PUBLISHED: 2023-03-27
In Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master versions prior to 1.0.5, an attacker could use URL decoding to retrieve system files, credentials, and bypass authentication resulting in privilege escalation.
PUBLISHED: 2023-03-27
In Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master versions prior to 1.0.5, an attacker could use Lua scripts, which could allow an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code.
PUBLISHED: 2023-03-27
Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master versions prior to 1.0.5 contains an improper access control vulnerability in which an attacker can use the Device-Gateway service and bypass authorization, which could result in privilege escalation.
PUBLISHED: 2023-03-27
Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master versions prior to 1.0.5 are affected by a deserialization vulnerability targeting the Device-DataCollect service, which could allow deserialization of requests prior to authentication, resulting in remote code execution.
PUBLISHED: 2023-03-27
Heap-based Buffer Overflow in GitHub repository gpac/gpac prior to 2.4.0.