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Everything You Need to Know About DNS AttacksIt's important to understand DNS, potential attacks against it, and the tools and techniques required to defend DNS infrastructure. This report answers all the questions you were afraid to ask.
Domain Name Service (DNS) is a critical part of any organization's digital infrastructure, but it's also one of the least understood. DNS is designed to be invisible to business professionals, IT stakeholders, and many security professionals, but DNS's threat surface is large and widely targeted.
Attackers are causing a great deal of damage with an array of attacks such as denial of service, DNS cache poisoning, DNS hijackin, DNS tunneling, and DNS dangling. They are using DNS infrastructure to take control of inbound and outbound communications and preventing users from accessing the applications they are looking for. To stop attacks on DNS, security teams need to shore up the organization's security hygiene around DNS infrastructure, implement controls such as DNSSEC, and monitor DNS traffic
Incident Readiness and Building Response Playbook
In this special report, learn the Xs and Os of any good security incident readiness and response playbook.
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1 Comments
User Rank: Moderator
12/10/2020 | 6:12:57 PM
I don't expect this situation to change whatsoever, so I believe that the workaround is for security conscious users & organizations to assume that FOSS software is highly insecure and should only be run on untrusted PC's in untrusted network subnets. By this I mean that a computer network should be divided into isolated & firewalled subnets that are separated into high security (trusted), medium security (production), low security (untrusted) and public (totally untrusted) zones that never co-mingle their network traffic. That way security breaches in untrusted subnets are irrelevant to the organization because no valuable private information ever exists in them – they are only for public facing insecure tasks with no privacy value.
That, actually, makes sense for those of us embracing open source – why would we need data security privacy on a computer devoted to creating FOSS & FOSH content that we'll be donating to the global commons anyway? Sure, we might take basic security precautions, but nothing beyond that is worth our time & effort. Especially if the FOSS we're using is full of unpatched security holes anyway...