We also found that security problem log tickets, created in the ITSDB when a potential or actual IT system security vulnerability is identified, were not resolved for extended periods of time—sometimes longer than 180 days.

However, we found the database inventory incomplete and inaccurate, placing at risk JPL's ability to effectively monitor, report, and respond to security incidents.

Further, we found that JPL's network gateway that controls partner access to a shared IT environment for specific missions and data had not been properly segmented to limit users only to those systems and applications for which they had approved access.

PL had not implemented a threat hunting program recommended by IT security experts to aggressively pursue abnormal activity on its systems for signs of compromise, and instead rely on an ad hoc process to search for intruders.

We found that multiple JPL incident management and response practices deviate from NASA and recommended industry practices.For example, unlike NASA's Security Operations Center (SOC), JPL's SOC does not maintain round-the-clock availability of IT security incident responders and JPL's incident response plan does not include all federally-recommended elements.

In addition, team coordination issues delayed completion of incident containment and eradication steps for the April 2018 incident.

No controls were in place to ensure JPL compliance with this requirement nor did NASA officials have access to JPL's incident management system.

As of March 2019, the Agency had not approved JPL's plans to implement new IT security policies and requirements NASA included in its October 2018 contract.

Cisco Network - show mac address-table | in b8:27:eb

show ip arp vlan <vlan no> | include b827.eb