Enterprise Vulnerabilities
From DHS/US-CERT's National Vulnerability Database
CVE-2022-31650PUBLISHED: 2022-05-25In SoX 14.4.2, there is a floating-point exception in lsx_aiffstartwrite in aiff.c in libsox.a.
CVE-2022-31651PUBLISHED: 2022-05-25In SoX 14.4.2, there is an assertion failure in rate_init in rate.c in libsox.a.
CVE-2022-29256PUBLISHED: 2022-05-25
sharp is an application for Node.js image processing. Prior to version 0.30.5, there is a possible vulnerability in logic that is run only at `npm install` time when installing versions of `sharp` prior to the latest v0.30.5. If an attacker has the ability to set the value of the `PKG_CONFIG_PATH` e...
CVE-2022-26067PUBLISHED: 2022-05-25
An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine SecureTransferFiles functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform V16.00.0112. A specially-crafted series of network requests can lead to arbitrary file read. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnera...
CVE-2022-26077PUBLISHED: 2022-05-25
A cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine configuration communications functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform V16.00.0112. A targeted network sniffing attack can lead to a disclosure of sensitive information. An attacker can sniff networ...
User Rank: Strategist
5/12/2018 | 10:29:41 AM
The real problem here, as it always is with SMS-based 2FA where a message is sent to the user, is excatly that: that the message is sent TO the user.
Text messages sent to phones are, by definition, both unencrypted and easy to intercept, as Mr. Mitnick has amply demonstrated. The answer to this problem is to reverse the process and have the user authenticate their login or identity by sending a message FROM their phone.
Here's why this works: the U.S. short code system eliminates spoofing of phone numbers thanks to the carriers. Cloning/spoofing/duplicating SIMs and IMEIs is a problem for carriers for a simple reason: the lose money when someone doesn't pay for another line. They solved this problem long ago by implementing a barrier that has yet to be successfully hacked.
This more secure approach reverses the process by having the user send a text from their device into an independent third-party server. The server then makes a secure handshake with the web page where the authentication is occurring. This completely eliminates the type of attack Mr. Mitnick successfully used (man-in-the-middle or man-in-the-browser) and confirms that the inbound SMS has come from the right number, registered IMEI and contains the right code. I welcome Mr. Mitnick to test the system. I will be happy to provide him with complete information about it and give him a test account.
Nothing is unhackable (although ours has not yet been successfully hacked) but we are confident that SnapID is substanially LESS hackable than any other SMS-based 2FA method on the market.