Look, But Don't Touch: One Key to Better ICS Security
As a doctor, if you don't trust your temperature and blood pressure readings, you cannot make a diagnosis.
Currently, many people equate network anomaly detection (malware) to cyber security. Moreover, many people associate network anomalies to physical process anomalies. However because of the lack of authenticated, secured process sensing (e.g., pressure, level, flow, temperature, voltage, current, radiation, etc.), it is not possible to correlate physical process anomalies (e.g., changes in boiler temperature, pipe pressure, tank level, voltage, etc.) to network anomaly detection (e.g., malware, network packet compromise, etc.). Since network monitoring programs can only interrogate network packets, any changes to process sensing before they become packets can NOT be detected by network monitoring solutions. The lack of correlating network anomalies to process anomalies has led to self-inflicted denial-of-service disruptions.
The solution to this glaring gap in control system cyber security due to insecure process sensing is to detect changes in process sensing BEFORE the sensor information goes through the serial-to-Ethernet converters. Issues caused by the compromise of the sensors before the serial-to-Ethernet converters would NOT be identified through network monitoring. This is important as it is possible to compromise the sensor output before the serial-to-Ethernet converters particularly as these converters have been hacked in the U.S. and Ukraine to deliver the Black Energy malware.
Possible impacts of compromised sensor data include the inability to reach a setpoint (e.g., safety valves or protective relays not opening damaging equipment), inadvertently reaching a setpoint (e.g., plant shutdowns or electric outages), providing misleading information to the HMI (e.g., having the operator take the wrong actions), or compromising controllers or actuators, etc. June 13, 2017, I gave a presentation on "The Implications of the Ukrainian Cyber Attacks to Nuclear Plants" to the American Nuclear Society in San Francisco which explicitly addressed these issues.
I believe that having an informed decision as to when to shut down a physical process occurs when you have a view of the actual process via the raw process sensing. This is because the raw process sensing will indicate a process change regardless if the change is from unintentional or malicious reasons. Moreover, viewing the raw process is independent of network cyber considerations. Given how sophisticated hackers are able to bypass cyber security protections such as CrashOverride, viewing the raw process becomes even more important.
Joe Weiss
Incorporating a Prevention Mindset into Threat Detection and ResponseThreat detection and response systems, by definition, are reactive because they have to wait for damage to be done before finding the attack. With a prevention-mindset, security teams can proactively anticipate the attacker's next move, rather than reacting to specific threats or trying to detect the latest techniques in real-time.
The report covers areas enterprises should focus on:
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User Rank: Apprentice
7/2/2017 | 1:05:19 AM
Currently, many people equate network anomaly detection (malware) to cyber security. Moreover, many people associate network anomalies to physical process anomalies. However because of the lack of authenticated, secured process sensing (e.g., pressure, level, flow, temperature, voltage, current, radiation, etc.), it is not possible to correlate physical process anomalies (e.g., changes in boiler temperature, pipe pressure, tank level, voltage, etc.) to network anomaly detection (e.g., malware, network packet compromise, etc.). Since network monitoring programs can only interrogate network packets, any changes to process sensing before they become packets can NOT be detected by network monitoring solutions. The lack of correlating network anomalies to process anomalies has led to self-inflicted denial-of-service disruptions.
The solution to this glaring gap in control system cyber security due to insecure process sensing is to detect changes in process sensing BEFORE the sensor information goes through the serial-to-Ethernet converters. Issues caused by the compromise of the sensors before the serial-to-Ethernet converters would NOT be identified through network monitoring. This is important as it is possible to compromise the sensor output before the serial-to-Ethernet converters particularly as these converters have been hacked in the U.S. and Ukraine to deliver the Black Energy malware.
Possible impacts of compromised sensor data include the inability to reach a setpoint (e.g., safety valves or protective relays not opening damaging equipment), inadvertently reaching a setpoint (e.g., plant shutdowns or electric outages), providing misleading information to the HMI (e.g., having the operator take the wrong actions), or compromising controllers or actuators, etc. June 13, 2017, I gave a presentation on "The Implications of the Ukrainian Cyber Attacks to Nuclear Plants" to the American Nuclear Society in San Francisco which explicitly addressed these issues.
I believe that having an informed decision as to when to shut down a physical process occurs when you have a view of the actual process via the raw process sensing. This is because the raw process sensing will indicate a process change regardless if the change is from unintentional or malicious reasons. Moreover, viewing the raw process is independent of network cyber considerations. Given how sophisticated hackers are able to bypass cyber security protections such as CrashOverride, viewing the raw process becomes even more important.
Joe Weiss