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Re: Training +
We absolutely need better security technology -- such as authentication measures like you suggest.
But authentication can sometimes be falsified, and no amount of technology is foolproof. Your doors and locks and alarms won't work if one of your employees just holds the door open for an attacker. Security awareness and training for all employees is imperative.
But authentication can sometimes be falsified, and no amount of technology is foolproof. Your doors and locks and alarms won't work if one of your employees just holds the door open for an attacker. Security awareness and training for all employees is imperative.
Human error
This is a really good article. I agree we shouldn't blame the user, but instead educate as much as possible. I think we should add heightened physical security to the strategic next steps. We should make sure user lock up their computers when not in use by using automatic tools like Bluetooth proximity device. This will elimate human error.
Re: It can never be the user's fault
This is so right! You can't blame the users, as much as you might want to. The best thing to do is to constantly be thinking ahead and constantly be assessing the benefit and success of your security efforts. There's a great blog post about how to do that on the FireEye website.
--KB
Karen Bannan. commenting on behalf of IDG and FireEye.
--KB
Karen Bannan. commenting on behalf of IDG and FireEye.
It can never be the user's fault
We can never put the blame on the user for a breach. It would be like blaming a driver for faulty brakes on his car.
Training is essential; we need to develop a common understanding about insecurities in surfing and email for instance. It's like teaching your kids to lock the door when leaving home.
But the rest is our job! We, the security professionals, it's our job to make security simple enough to be used. Users are under pressure to fulfill their job description and perform the tasks they have been employed to do. If security is in their way, they will find workarounds so that they can fulfill their tasks and still be home for dinner. It must be easier to do right than to do wrong, and the only ones that can make it easy are we that know security and tech. If our tools are not good enough, change tools and put some pressure on the suppliers (spoiler, I am a supplier).
Training is essential; we need to develop a common understanding about insecurities in surfing and email for instance. It's like teaching your kids to lock the door when leaving home.
But the rest is our job! We, the security professionals, it's our job to make security simple enough to be used. Users are under pressure to fulfill their job description and perform the tasks they have been employed to do. If security is in their way, they will find workarounds so that they can fulfill their tasks and still be home for dinner. It must be easier to do right than to do wrong, and the only ones that can make it easy are we that know security and tech. If our tools are not good enough, change tools and put some pressure on the suppliers (spoiler, I am a supplier).
Re: Training +
the right answer of course is that eMails need to be authenticated -- so that you can be sure you know who you are talking to
but that doesn't apply just to eMails, Forms 1040, for example, are in desperate need of authentication
Secure Computing in a Compromised Environment
it is no secret that all of our usual identification data, -- name, address, social security number, date of birth, mother's maiden name, eMail address ... have been compromised and are commonly available in public . see also Brian Krebs: SUPERGET article.
we require then a method of identification that can be used to prove the authenticity of a document in public but which at the same time allows us to retain control over the ability to provide such authentications
symmetric keys -- such as we have been using -- name, dob, ssan, ... don't work
fortunately there is a solution -- and it has been worked out many years ago by gentlemen such as Whitfile Diffie and Martin Hellman. it is known as Public Key Encryption, or "PGP" for short
PGP is available as a product -- you can buy it from Symentaic as PGP/Desktop or you can use the Gnu Privacy Guard also known as GnuPG
popular mythology claims PGP is too difficult to use but this is simply not the case when PGP is incorporated as packaged technology
for a good example of this I recommend learning to use the ENIGMAIL plug-in that is available on the Thunderbird eMail client. the built in dialog will allow you to generate and sign keys, update the keyserver, sign and authenticate eMails,-- the whole 9 yards
questions need to be asked as to why we do not make better use of this technology. some answers might not be too palatable.
but that doesn't apply just to eMails, Forms 1040, for example, are in desperate need of authentication
Secure Computing in a Compromised Environment
it is no secret that all of our usual identification data, -- name, address, social security number, date of birth, mother's maiden name, eMail address ... have been compromised and are commonly available in public . see also Brian Krebs: SUPERGET article.
we require then a method of identification that can be used to prove the authenticity of a document in public but which at the same time allows us to retain control over the ability to provide such authentications
symmetric keys -- such as we have been using -- name, dob, ssan, ... don't work
fortunately there is a solution -- and it has been worked out many years ago by gentlemen such as Whitfile Diffie and Martin Hellman. it is known as Public Key Encryption, or "PGP" for short
PGP is available as a product -- you can buy it from Symentaic as PGP/Desktop or you can use the Gnu Privacy Guard also known as GnuPG
popular mythology claims PGP is too difficult to use but this is simply not the case when PGP is incorporated as packaged technology
for a good example of this I recommend learning to use the ENIGMAIL plug-in that is available on the Thunderbird eMail client. the built in dialog will allow you to generate and sign keys, update the keyserver, sign and authenticate eMails,-- the whole 9 yards
questions need to be asked as to why we do not make better use of this technology. some answers might not be too palatable.
Re: Eliminating The Human Element?
To speak of SECTF, it's worth noting that at DEF CON 21, the worst-performing company target at SECTF was a tech company -- specifically, Apple!
Training
Of course, when talking training, it's important to note what is meant by that.
Security consultant Chris Hadnagy, for example advocates that companies send "fake" phishing emails to their employees -- and those who click the link are taken to a training site that forces them to immediately complete a very brief training session on IDing phishing.
This alone, according to Hadnagy, can reduce successful phishing attempts against an organization by more than 75 percent.
Security consultant Chris Hadnagy, for example advocates that companies send "fake" phishing emails to their employees -- and those who click the link are taken to a training site that forces them to immediately complete a very brief training session on IDing phishing.
This alone, according to Hadnagy, can reduce successful phishing attempts against an organization by more than 75 percent.
Eliminating The Human Element?
Ah, my favorite topic under the InfoSec banner. One thing I find the most interesting is the difference in approach to the same topic between conferences like Interop and those like DEF CON. On the one hand, the more professional approach is to figure out how to change the existing approach to training staff, how to "mix it up" and make it more entertaining and/or more easy to understand, and then on the other hand... Well, if you were at DEF CON 18 you know the results of the Social Engineering Capture the Flag sessions and why large organization who continue to follow "old-school" standards and methodologies still don't get it. Lots of great ideas here in this DarkReading article, and I think that figuring out HOW to improve upon defense against social engineering will benefit from participating in, watching over and reading results of CTF sessions like the below and reviewing real-world data. Personally, I'm all for eliminating the human element altogether :-)
Of note, the primary findings of the SECTF at DEF CON 18 included the below, which actually is not very surprising, and in some ways seems to be less intuitive that what some organizations do or propose to do:
· For awareness training to be truly effective it requires complete coverage of all employees. In many instances contestants would contact call centers, which often do not have as complete of awareness training programs. This translated into information leakage that could have been avoided as well as significant increase of risk to the target organizations. Demonstration of the ineffectiveness of awareness training was apparent by the lack of employee resistance to answering questions.
· When employees do not have clear guidelines set in place in response to a given situation, they will default to actions that they perceive as being helpful. This natural response was what was utilized in every instance where contestants obtained high scores.
· Companies need to provide direction to employees on social media issues and expectations. Social media remains a low effort vector for information gathering that very few organizations are addressing.
· Information perceived as having no value will not be protected. This is the underlying fact that most social engineering efforts rely upon, as value to an attacker is different than value to an organization. Companies need to consider this when evaluating what to protect, considering more than just the importance of value to the delivery of service, product, or intellectual property.
· Organizations need to understand that regardless of the protections in place, information such as operating system, browser version and so on will be compromised. Security by obscurity is still not an option, as it oftentimes leads to a breach. Security through education must be the foundation of every solution -- education on the tactics, the methods and thinking of malicious. This education will inform all other actions, providing an increase in effectiveness.
Here are the flags they sought to (and very successfully did) capture, information fetched by phone:
Check out Social Engineer (socialengineer [dot] org) for the full PDF report.
Of note, the primary findings of the SECTF at DEF CON 18 included the below, which actually is not very surprising, and in some ways seems to be less intuitive that what some organizations do or propose to do:
· For awareness training to be truly effective it requires complete coverage of all employees. In many instances contestants would contact call centers, which often do not have as complete of awareness training programs. This translated into information leakage that could have been avoided as well as significant increase of risk to the target organizations. Demonstration of the ineffectiveness of awareness training was apparent by the lack of employee resistance to answering questions.
· When employees do not have clear guidelines set in place in response to a given situation, they will default to actions that they perceive as being helpful. This natural response was what was utilized in every instance where contestants obtained high scores.
· Companies need to provide direction to employees on social media issues and expectations. Social media remains a low effort vector for information gathering that very few organizations are addressing.
· Information perceived as having no value will not be protected. This is the underlying fact that most social engineering efforts rely upon, as value to an attacker is different than value to an organization. Companies need to consider this when evaluating what to protect, considering more than just the importance of value to the delivery of service, product, or intellectual property.
· Organizations need to understand that regardless of the protections in place, information such as operating system, browser version and so on will be compromised. Security by obscurity is still not an option, as it oftentimes leads to a breach. Security through education must be the foundation of every solution -- education on the tactics, the methods and thinking of malicious. This education will inform all other actions, providing an increase in effectiveness.
Here are the flags they sought to (and very successfully did) capture, information fetched by phone:
- In House IT Support?
- Trash Handling?
- How are Documents Disposed of?
- Who Does Offsite Back-Up?
- Employee Schedules?
- PBX System?
- Name of PBX?
- Employee Termination Process
- New Hire Process?
- Open a Fake URL
- What OS Used?
- What Service Pack?
- Mail Client?
- Version of Mail client?
- Anti-Virus Used?
- Computer Make and Model
- Wireless On-Site?
- ESSID Name?
- Days of Months Paid?
- Duration of Employment?
- Shipping Supplier?
- Time Deliveries Are Made?
- Browser?
- Version of Browser?
- PDF Reader?
- Version of PDF Reader?
- Websites Blocked?
- VPN In Use?
- VPN Software?
- Badges for Bldg Access?
- Is there a Cafeteria?
- Who Supplies Food?
Check out Social Engineer (socialengineer [dot] org) for the full PDF report.
Re: Replacing poor training with impractical technical controls is not a real solution.
Agree with PaxDominicus01 -- when going through Rob's suggestions, I thought along these same lines -- How would a average or below-average org ever evolve to implement these difficult-to-implement technical controls?
However, I am not a proponent of security awareness training. The Harvard study is fascinating, and from my experience, both relevant and true. Security awareness training is one of the least effective approaches.
The best approach is to leverage a fourth control type: deceptive controls. Rob mentions protective, detective, and responsive controls but fails to identify this fourth category. We must model users as insider threats. They are unintentional insiders.
There are four types of insiders: the primary, "malicious" (deliberate intent), and the three unintentional, "disdain of security practices", "careless", and "ignorant". The Harvard study would put unintentional insiders in the disdain category, while Rob identifies most users as ignorant. A security professional who gets phished (N.B., this has happened to me -- I am fine to admit as much) would fall into the "careless" category.
The controls identiifed by Rob are largely based on human checks and balances against automated controls and processes. I would especially note that they do not place the responders close to the events and incidents. Integration is a key element of a successful security control, which is again why I recommend deception systems. Give the threats what they want and watch what they do -- pull the plug when they go too far. Even better -- lead them down a path using breadcrumbs so that you know what they will do because you can predict their behaviors. Take advantage of the whole kill chain if you can supply a sufficiently-advanced deception system that supports each stage with fake or misdirected components. Think DataSoft Nova.
There is also a lack of the identification of the primary source of vulnerability during root-cause analysis and lessons learned. The users aren't using OpenLDAP passwords -- it's Active Directory that is guilty of compromise every time. When phished -- threats don't gain access to hardened Linux laptops: they are Windows 7 systems with AppLocker (or similar) at best, and even then -- Powershell (or modifications such as NetSPI ClickOne) sneaks right by all of these app-whitelisting, antivirus, and HIPS controls, even if and when they exist. PtT and PtH attacks are bringing down the house. Forcing unpriviledged users barely helps. It can't help. It won't.
I am talking about issues with Windows laptops and Microsoft Window Server forests. Users need a new way of accessing their existing resources. I suggest U2Fs in smartcard mode for these Windows domains -- completely replace and turn off NTLM and Kerberos. Apple should force a minimum 5-character PIN along with a forced Lockdown cert on all iDevice installs -- and Android should follow this as a standard authentication (i.e., Secure Enclave) model. Basic entry points such as these must be protected. Old ways must be abandoned. Why don't we have dynamic identifiers to replace our SSNs and payment card numbers yet? Contactless payments are not innovating as far as risk reduction; they are increasing the risk. Nobody knows that their EMV card or compatible device, tag, or hand implant can be cloned or proxied. They just think "it's a secure method of payment because it came from the bank".
However, I am not a proponent of security awareness training. The Harvard study is fascinating, and from my experience, both relevant and true. Security awareness training is one of the least effective approaches.
The best approach is to leverage a fourth control type: deceptive controls. Rob mentions protective, detective, and responsive controls but fails to identify this fourth category. We must model users as insider threats. They are unintentional insiders.
There are four types of insiders: the primary, "malicious" (deliberate intent), and the three unintentional, "disdain of security practices", "careless", and "ignorant". The Harvard study would put unintentional insiders in the disdain category, while Rob identifies most users as ignorant. A security professional who gets phished (N.B., this has happened to me -- I am fine to admit as much) would fall into the "careless" category.
The controls identiifed by Rob are largely based on human checks and balances against automated controls and processes. I would especially note that they do not place the responders close to the events and incidents. Integration is a key element of a successful security control, which is again why I recommend deception systems. Give the threats what they want and watch what they do -- pull the plug when they go too far. Even better -- lead them down a path using breadcrumbs so that you know what they will do because you can predict their behaviors. Take advantage of the whole kill chain if you can supply a sufficiently-advanced deception system that supports each stage with fake or misdirected components. Think DataSoft Nova.
There is also a lack of the identification of the primary source of vulnerability during root-cause analysis and lessons learned. The users aren't using OpenLDAP passwords -- it's Active Directory that is guilty of compromise every time. When phished -- threats don't gain access to hardened Linux laptops: they are Windows 7 systems with AppLocker (or similar) at best, and even then -- Powershell (or modifications such as NetSPI ClickOne) sneaks right by all of these app-whitelisting, antivirus, and HIPS controls, even if and when they exist. PtT and PtH attacks are bringing down the house. Forcing unpriviledged users barely helps. It can't help. It won't.
I am talking about issues with Windows laptops and Microsoft Window Server forests. Users need a new way of accessing their existing resources. I suggest U2Fs in smartcard mode for these Windows domains -- completely replace and turn off NTLM and Kerberos. Apple should force a minimum 5-character PIN along with a forced Lockdown cert on all iDevice installs -- and Android should follow this as a standard authentication (i.e., Secure Enclave) model. Basic entry points such as these must be protected. Old ways must be abandoned. Why don't we have dynamic identifiers to replace our SSNs and payment card numbers yet? Contactless payments are not innovating as far as risk reduction; they are increasing the risk. Nobody knows that their EMV card or compatible device, tag, or hand implant can be cloned or proxied. They just think "it's a secure method of payment because it came from the bank".
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User Rank: Ninja
5/19/2015 | 6:13:15 PM
> "We can never put the blame on the user for a breach. It would be like blaming a driver for faulty brakes on his car."
Well, that's taking it a bit far, I think, depending upon the circumstances.
It's like an apartment or condo building where there are locks on the doors and you have to have someone you know buzz you in if you don't have a key or a fob. Good security, right? Unless all the residents just hold the door open and let people in. When people's apartments start getting robbed by burglars who know all they have to do is wait outside for someone to come by and let them in, whose fault is it?