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How We Can Prevent Another Anthem Breach
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psullivan726
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psullivan726,
User Rank: Apprentice
2/23/2015 | 10:07:48 AM
class action
How in the world can a health care company NOT have two factor authentication - and there not be some sort of signifcant penalty?  While they are providing credit monitoring (big-dot deal...smh) it certainly does not complensate individuals nor does it preven the living hell that one must go through.  

Until someone takes up the legal battle to make one of these big companies 'pay' this will never change.  We need a class action suit....a big one.  
Yallaen1
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Yallaen1,
User Rank: Apprentice
2/20/2015 | 11:01:57 AM
Re: It costs more to build a bigger wall than it does to make a longer ladder
FIrst, great reply. Makes total sense! Second; I am grabbing your VBOD acronymn and am using it! That's great!!

 
TerryB
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TerryB,
User Rank: Ninja
2/19/2015 | 3:12:09 PM
Re: No Two Factor?
Thanks for taking time to explain better. I was just trying to understand this in context of the Sony and Anthem hacks. As I said, we are Mfg company, we don't have credit card or social security info, nothing you could monetize. Ransomware about only thing that would be relevant, if money was your goal.

We aren't under HIPPA or PCI and yet we have hard tokens. I was just curious whether these guys were using two factor to control access to internal systems, especially when phishing was mentioned as opening door on both. At our company, even if I told you a domain admin password for internal systems you'd somehow still have to beat this two factor protection to use it. Well, at least from China anyway.

I get Sony maybe not having two factor, Anthem makes no sense at all being in health care. Thanks again for the input.
daver234
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daver234,
User Rank: Apprentice
2/19/2015 | 2:47:03 PM
Re: No Two Factor?
The SecurID token you're familiar with is refered to as a hard-token.  RSA/EMC also makes tokens available as "soft tokens" which can be put onto mobile devices (iPhones / iPads, Android, etc.) and other operating systems such as Windows and OS X.  With soft tokens, the user enters their PIN into the software and then an 8-digit code is generated.  It's possible that for the software tokens, a bad guy could get a keyboard logger and / or remote access tookit installed on the target system.  They'd then be able to learn the PIN and remote control the system to generate a legitimate token.  

To be clear, having 2FA is typically better than not with regards to security, but a question was asked for how it would not be effective so I've provided an example.  

For other solutions of 2FA such as SMS or things like PhoneFactor, both of those have weaknesses as well. Particularly on Android phones, bad guys may be able to install software which intercepts the code sent via the SMS message.  For PhoneFactor, there's a well-known pen tester which has said that he's frequently able to beat this during tests through some social engineering.  

This could be a way longer conversation around risks vs. usability.  Each company / individual needs to make informed decisions around which risks they're willing to accept in order to gain usability.  

 

 
TerryB
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TerryB,
User Rank: Ninja
2/19/2015 | 12:47:00 PM
Re: No Two Factor?
@Daver234, I guess anything poorly done could be compromised. My only experience on 2 factor is here at work and with my online banking.

At work, we use RSA SecurId. I won't pretend to know all the details of the implementation but no question it is server based, quite possibly a server at RSA themselves. It just implements a changing 6 digit number based on some seed value. I've never read the randomizing algorithm could be/has been compromised. It then links to a physical token with a Serial no# assigned to it. That Serial is linked to your User Id/PIN. So at a minimum, hacker would need physical access to the token or the server where this config is stored to get that Serial. Then if hacker could duplicate the algorithm, or use some kind of MiM on token to intercept code, then hacker could get a VPN tunnel to our internal network and begin discovery.

The bank uses a SMS one time password sent to my choice of cell phone, email, etc. So hacker would need my User and Password, then have to be able to intercept this SMS somehow. This technique appears to be inifinitely more hackable than our work two factor. But keystroke logger alone won't cut it, you would need more even for bank.

That is why I'm asking these questions about two factor, are their ANY real cases of industrial strength 2 factor being compromised? I've personally never read such a story but I spend far less time reading security stuff versus application topics that I work in. Dark Reading is about only thing that gives me view of the security world.
jamieinmontreal
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jamieinmontreal,
User Rank: Strategist
2/19/2015 | 11:40:42 AM
Re: No Two Factor?
Terry, you're right in 2FA being a means to prevent phishing attacks from succeeding more concerning is if the person having the ability to authentiate is co-erced or is indeed the threat.   Definitely a strong layer to add in regardless.
jamieinmontreal
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jamieinmontreal,
User Rank: Strategist
2/19/2015 | 11:12:36 AM
It costs more to build a bigger wall than it does to make a longer ladder
Dave, nice article indeed and following on rightly from Sara's work around this thorny topic!   To expand on the subject line it's quite stunning how many organisations have concentrated efforts on perimiter defence (keep them out) and on building higher and stronger walls.   The cost of this continual upgrading of firewalls, SIEM software, pen tests, Anti "X" devices and so on is incredible!   The cost on the other hand for inventive hackers who cost little but can achieve much is absolutely minimal in comparison.

More and more successful breaches are showing to have "insider access" as the root casue either through phished credentials or someone with admin rights deliberately taking info they shouldn't.   The solution to this is absolutely available and it's better management of privileged credentials, there are several companies out there that offer software to manage elevated access to systems (disclosure time - I work for one of them, Hitachi ID Systems) but the key message is in getting CISOs to review this piece of their armoury.

The Privileged Acess Manager software doesn't build on your walls, it simply puts an impossible maze inside and outside of the walls protecting your Valuable Blob Of Data (VBOD - yes... I made it up) and changes the configuration of that maze as often as you need.

If the ladder can't get to the wall, you eliminate the threat.

If the threat actor is already inside the wall you can still mitigate risk by requiring consistent (yet automated and simple) re-authorisation for access.   Anthem and Sony data was gathered over months, this would not have happened if better Privileged Access Management protocols were in place and enforced.

 
daver234
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daver234,
User Rank: Apprentice
2/19/2015 | 8:39:40 AM
Re: No Two Factor?
Here's one way... companies may fail to air-gap the token generating software in favor of convenience.  In other words, they could install the token generating software on PCs where it could be subject to keyloggers, which could then capture the PIN used to generte the token.  
dak3
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dak3,
User Rank: Moderator
2/18/2015 | 3:20:29 PM
Re: No Two Factor?
To the best of my knowledge, from all I have read, Anthem did not require 2-factor authentication.
TerryB
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TerryB,
User Rank: Ninja
2/18/2015 | 2:20:06 PM
No Two Factor?
Dave, when you say they may have phished the credentials from an employee, does that mean two factor was not in play at this company? How would phish credentials when access depends on one time SMS password or SecurId token changing numbers every 30 seconds?

I asked same question on article on Sony hack, neither author or any commenters took any time to respond. Not sure if that means they don't know or they don't feel two factor would have made a difference. But for life of me, I do not see how you can phish credentials when protected by something like that.
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