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Practical Network Security Approaches for a Multicloud, Hybrid IT WorldThe report covers areas enterprises should focus on for their multicloud/hybrid cloud security strategy:
-increase visibility over the environment
-learning cloud-specific skills
-relying on established security frameworks
-re-architecting the network
Incident Readiness and Building Response Playbook
In this special report, learn the Xs and Os of any good security incident readiness and response playbook.
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User Rank: Ninja
11/13/2014 | 6:51:44 PM
I recall reading that several facts of the attack would make self-sabotage out of the question, the argument being that if the Iranians at the plants were going to sabotage themselves, they wouldn't create such a complex worm to do it. Expense, intelligence involved, sheer hours to develop the work and the fact all the exploits it used were exposed and can't necessarily be used again; all point to external players. Additionally, highly-guarded authentic private keys from two large companies were compromised and used to digitally-sign the worm, making the software "authentic", and the fact that four (at least) zero-day exploits were used to spread this worm - hardcore. But I'd argue that we've seen more sophistication in the Middle East that we'd previously given credit for, even if it was gained through working with outsiders. Remember, these plants are staffed with sharp engineers and whatever the reason for it, there could easily have been a motive for someone in one of the organizations listed, Foolad standing out, to kick off Stuxnet.