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6/18/2014
12:00 PM
Cam Roberson
Cam Roberson
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Data Security Decisions In A World Without TrueCrypt

The last days of TrueCrypt left many unanswered questions. But one thing is certain: When encryption freeware ends its life abruptly, being a freeloader can get you into a load of trouble.

The sudden demise of the encryption freeware TrueCrypt has left users and security experts to consider a couple of mysteries. First, what the heck happened to it? Second, and probably more important in the long term, where do the individuals and businesses that had been running TrueCrypt now go for their security needs?

On May 28, TrueCrypt’s official website began redirecting to a warning reading, “Using TrueCrypt is not secure as it may contain unfixed security issues.” A brief explanation followed, stating that development of TrueCrypt was killed in May following Microsoft’s termination of support for Windows XP. Then, in a curious choice for a team of open source developers, the remainder of the redirect page instructs users on how to migrate from TrueCrypt to BitLocker, Microsoft’s proprietary encryption product.

With the unknowns in this case set against the current backdrop of NSA scandals, reports of secret government requests for information issued to tech companies along with gag orders, and the pervasive sense that personal privacy is fading into an illusion, the TrueCrypt situation has been a perfect fuel for conspiracy theories -- and, really, who doesn’t love a good conspiracy theory?

Consider the possibilities
Is TrueCrypt’s explanation of Microsoft's ending support for Windows XP sufficient? Newer versions of Windows do come with BitLocker or EFS (Encrypting File System) built-in, ostensibly reducing the need for additional software. However, neither of these is built-in with Windows “Home” Editions, and the explanation does nothing to address TrueCrypt’s coverage of Mac and Linux systems.

Could TrueCrypt’s seeming endorsement of BitLocker be evidence that Microsoft bought them off? Or was it government agents in black suits and dark shades who got to them? TrueCrypt was famously the encryption tool recommended by Edward Snowden. There is a list of known legal cases where the FBI and law enforcement desired to get past TrueCrypt encryption, and it could not be cracked. Did the NSA bring pressure upon TrueCrypt’s creators, compromising the software’s defenses? Is Lifetime already buying the rights to a made-for-TV movie?

Just too much work
There’s likely a simpler, less provocative explanation. After a decade of uncompensated labor, the team behind TrueCrypt may have just grown tired of building, hosting, and supporting the product for free. A crowd-funded code and penetration
review of TrueCrypt supported by the Open Crypto Audit Project, although outwardly welcomed by the TrueCrypt team and positive in its first phase conclusions, may have caused team members to consider their project thankless. Or they may have simply accepted that BitLocker is sufficient protection for your average individual user and that it is now standard on a large enough share of Windows PCs to render their product no longer crucial enough to justify the effort.

Regardless of the truth behind the last days of TrueCrypt, the real question for users is what to do now. The answer will probably be different (and should be different) for individual and business applications. An individual owns the responsibility for his data. BitLocker and EFS come free as part of Windows on many PCs and are reasonably easy to turn on and off. For normal individual use, they do the job. Because Microsoft backs them, they have a guaranteed level of compatibility and longevity.

We would not recommend freeware encryption tools for exactly this reason: As with TrueCrypt, there are fewer guarantees that free tools will remain available and supported in the long term. In our opinion, the motivation, dedication, and responsibility to continue building and supporting software is severely diminished without profit motivation. There is a lot of encryption freeware available, but none more popular and well-respected than the now defunct TrueCrypt. The bottom line is that. In fact, using built-in tools is TrueCrypt’s final recommendation as well, and we agree when it comes to the security needs of an individual.

You get what you pay for
Businesses have more complex needs than individuals, and should look for more comprehensive security. Recent incidents with Target stores and the Heartbleed virus have proved how vulnerable and liable a business can be following a breach in data security. When choosing data encryption solutions, businesses should take a hard look at what they get for free versus what a small spend can provide.

More complex tools that aren’t shortcuts might make the most sense. Businesses need tools that enforce data security over their entire employee base. They need policy control capabilities: password requirements, lockouts, and key management. These tools must not encumber employee productivity and be easy for IT to manage and support. Mobile devices are a concern for businesses as well, and not only smartphones and tablets, but also USB devices, all holding sensitive and potentially damaging business data. Businesses may consider tools that can protect data in situations where encryption can’t: when a device is stolen with the power on, or when a contractor or employee is no longer in good standing.

As with individuals, we recommend that businesses seek solutions that use built-in encryption tools for their virtues of compatibility and longevity. However, more is required of a business-class tool. Top security tool providers recognize that supporting built-in encryption is much easier than attempting to incorporate encryption into an OS. Adding, supporting, and updating pre-boot processes and integrating with hardware is difficult. As the same time, Macs, iOS, and Android have built integrated encryption modules that can be leveraged by the right data security tools. Data can be remotely managed or wiped, and devices quarantined, taking the burden of data protection away from employees. These more robust business-class options, while more expensive than freeware, can amount to an immense savings. With data security solutions, you get what you pay for, and free can cost you.

Cam Roberson is the Director of the Reseller Channel for Beachhead Solutions, a company that designs cloud-managed mobile device security tools. View Full Bio
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Robert McDougal
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Robert McDougal,
User Rank: Ninja
6/18/2014 | 12:26:11 PM
Moving on from TrueCrypt
I tend to believe that the creators of TrueCrypt were approached by Microsoft with a deal they couldn't refuse.  I have no evidence to support that other than the recommendation of bitlocker.  Just call it a gut feeling.

As far as what to do now I would recommend looking into DiskCryptor .  While not as polished as TrueCrypt it does appear to be built upon solid security.
Randy Naramore
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Randy Naramore,
User Rank: Ninja
6/18/2014 | 12:42:45 PM
Re: Moving on from TrueCrypt
"When one door closes another opens", truecrypt has been good but maybe it is time to check out some other options and when the money talks... Good point Robby. 
Bulos Qoqish
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Bulos Qoqish,
User Rank: Apprentice
6/18/2014 | 12:31:02 PM
You're overlooking something...
I read your article about "what to do in the absence of TrueCrypt" with some interest; however, you are leaving out a few very important factors :


(1.) TrueCrypt - whatever its faults - was at least an Open Source application. Almost all commercial encryption systems (Bitlocker is the obvious example) are closed-source, meaning that one has to just take at face value, manufacturer representations that the cryptography involved is (a) correctly implemented and (b) free of "backdoors" to enable covert channel attacks by (for example) intelligence agencies. In the post-Snowden era, one would have to be crazily naive to be willing to accept this kind of assurance.


(2.) In the post-Snowden era, we must assume that all U.S.-invented, manufactured or owned software, including but not limited to the encryption systems that you advocate, have been compromised by the NSA and likely by other agencies such as the CIA, FBI, DIA, and just about anyone who wants to, under the USA PATRIOT Act and other applicable U.S. legislation. Bitlocker is the most obvious example of this but really ALL U.S.-owned software and hardware must be assumed to have been similarly compromised.

I'm sorry if you don't like hearing this, but it is the #1 concern for those of us outside the U.S., and there is NOTHING that you can do, now, to address the concern. Send all cards of thanks and appreciation to George Bush, Dick Cheney, Barack Obama, James Clapper, Michael Hayden and Keith Alexander.

(3.) As you point out, one of TrueCrypt's significant advantages was its multi-platform capabilities. These capabilities are starkly absent from most of the commercial products that you advocate (particularly BitLocker), many of which (Bitlocker, Apple FileVault, etc.) are deliberately engineered for marketing reasons, so as to lock a user into a platform-specific "walled garden". For those of us who need static data security in a heterogeneous endpoint environment, this issue is a "show stopper" for the Bitlockers of the world.

The bottom line? Something will replace TrueCrypt. That "something" will be Open Source and will be carefully designed so as to preclude compromise by the United States' pervasive, Orwellian surveillance state. TrueCrypt was a signature achievement in personal data privacy, and the next step will be a step forward, not backward - which is what you are advocating, by pushing Bitlocker.
CAMROBERSON
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CAMROBERSON,
User Rank: Author
6/18/2014 | 1:21:20 PM
Re: You're overlooking something...
I grapple with the question of what the NSA is capable of cracking and what it isn't. I suppose the NSA may have cracked TrueCrypt which may have drove its developers to take it down and assert "It's not secure." Who knows? I'm going to assume the NSA has a leg up on their "illegal" hacking brethren but I think most (law abiding) folks are concerned with criminals with financial motivations. With proper authentication and 256 bit encryption (built-in or commercially available) I think my data's safe. If the NSA wants to learn more about me they can do it the old-fashioned way and tap my phone. 
RetiredUser
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RetiredUser,
User Rank: Ninja
6/18/2014 | 4:23:10 PM
Re: You're overlooking something...
@Bulos Qoqish

At a high level, I have to agree with you.  I believe the most successful and useful security tools, whether on the pen-testing side or encryption side, are free and open source software (FOSS) for many of the reasons you note.

Time will tell, but I have high hopes for TrueCrypt.ch to do exactly what you identified, which is keep technology like this moving forward, improve upon it rather than run from it, and use the FOSS community to make it work the way we want, independent of licenses, patents and hidden functions.
gev
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gev,
User Rank: Moderator
6/19/2014 | 10:17:28 AM
Re: You're overlooking something...
You point finger at US only because it openly tells you about what is going on.

The lack of information about other developed and otherwise countries doing the same only tells me that they are either not caught yet, or are better able to silense the truth.
anon5472249769
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anon5472249769,
User Rank: Apprentice
6/19/2014 | 1:52:50 PM
Re: You're overlooking something...
Sorry, my friend, but you're bluffing with a hand of deuces here. The government of the United States of America is the ONLY country that has engaged in the full gamut of these practices (can you find me ONE... ONE example of someone else soldering backdoor chips on to the motherboards of Cisco routers, for example?), and everyone outside the U.S. knows about it (whether or not you want to acknowledge it).

Over time, we are simply going to stop using U.S.-manufactured software, hardware and services, because we have to assume that it has all been compromised. MIGHT equivalent equipment, if manufactured elsewhere, have been compromised? Possibly (although this is unlikely in most cases, with some exceptions such as Huawei). But thanks to Snowden, we KNOW -- way beyond a reasonable doubt -- that virtually ALL U.S.-manufactured equipment either already has been, or very well might soon be, "backdoored" by the NSA and other U.S. spook agencies.

I'm sorry if you don't like hearing that, but you don't get to argue about it. This IS the situation and the POV outside your country, and there's NOTHING that you now can do about it. The Humpty Dumpty of implicit foreign trust in the U.S. is broken, and all of Dick Cheney's horses and all of Barack Obama's men, can't put Humpty Dumpty, together, again.

Don't like that? Call Michael Hayden, Keith Alexander and James Clapper. Don't bother taking notes, because a few other people listening on the line, are already doing that for you.
theb0x
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theb0x,
User Rank: Ninja
6/19/2014 | 8:05:50 PM
Re: You're overlooking something...
This brings a whole new meaning to 'Debugging'. 
anon5131084689
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anon5131084689,
User Rank: Apprentice
6/18/2014 | 12:45:22 PM
Heartbleed
What's "The heartbleed virus" again?
theb0x
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theb0x,
User Rank: Ninja
6/18/2014 | 3:41:46 PM
FalseCrypt
I think there are quite a few code quality issues with TrueCrypt because it utilizes XTS2 as the block cipher mode of operation instead of using HMAC. The bootloader and Windows Kernel Driver also contain depreciated functions among other issues which are clearly visable in the source code. Because of this it lacks protection from certain modification to the volume. It would not surprise me the least bit if the NSA has further developed and exploited these flaws in a similar fashion to the Stoned Bootkit (a form of malware developed to MITM all read/write operations of the encrypted volume without breaking the encryption itself.) This attack works because TrueCrypt does not have the capability to prevent anything from being loaded prior to it's own MBR. I see this as being a similar issue with BitLocker if exploited correctly because it operates basically in the same maner.
gev
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gev,
User Rank: Moderator
6/19/2014 | 2:09:29 PM
yes I do
yes I do get to argue about anything - it is my right to free speach.

fact that you can not find anything only tells you that it is not found, not that it does not exist. And this is applicable unversally to everything.

coming from a totalitarian country, I do know what i am talking about, believe me.

 
kalbr88
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kalbr88,
User Rank: Apprentice
6/19/2014 | 3:45:20 PM
TrueCrypt's step by step recommendation for Mac as well
http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net/OtherPlatforms.html

TrueCrypt's site had also posted detailed instructions for Mac.

 
McDaveX
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McDaveX,
User Rank: Strategist
6/20/2014 | 12:23:01 PM
Truecrypt still going strong
While its possible the Audit might throw up a spanner, until then there is no major reason to abandon Truecrypt, so I am not seeing the point of this article?
li'l ciso
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li'l ciso,
User Rank: Strategist
6/20/2014 | 7:43:21 PM
TC volumes are Plain-Text when they are open...
Why does everyone forget that all encrypted voiumes are PT when they are open?

That goes for BL, PGP, SED's and TC. Encryption only protects you when the volume is closed. The NSA has 1001 exploits to get on your machine when it's running, why would they waste their time trying to crack TC... You just have to wait... then bam... insert surreptitious backdoor, or just read the data at that point... why crack TC/PGP/Bitlocker/Free-otfe at all?

Speaking of Free-OTFE, it was as good if not better than TC. And as far as I can recall, written by one woman, over a number of years, but feature for feature at least on windows, it was great. I can't speak to it's cross-platform-ness, but it was a great program. I don't think Plausible Deniablity was one of her things, but other than that I can't remember any major differences.

Good Day Sir
theb0x
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theb0x,
User Rank: Ninja
6/21/2014 | 1:15:13 PM
Re: TC volumes are Plain-Text when they are open...
@darkerreading Exactly, And not only that TC, PGP..etc all have plain-text MBR just waiting to be tampered with when the volume is open from the booted OS. Also, the symmetric key is stored in RAM which yes can be extracted.

With Hardware-FDE or SEDs (Self-Encrypting Drives), the symmetric key managment is contained within the hard drive controller itself eliminating memory as a potetntial attack vector. Also unlike software based encryption, the MBR is fully encrypted.

However, not all SEDs are created equal. I have in the past successfully bypassed the firmware based authentication of a drive which resulted in full access to the encrypted volume without the key.

 

 

 

 
CAMROBERSON
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CAMROBERSON,
User Rank: Author
6/23/2014 | 9:52:14 AM
Re: TC volumes are Plain-Text when they are open...
You're absolutely right, Darker. There is a real distinction as to why people get encryption. Many look just to check the "compliance" checkbox; to have safeharbor in the event of hardware loss. But is the data truly secure? There are many instances where the data isn't encrypted and then what? Enforcing sound authentication policy? Certainly. How about an ability to remotely reach out to that device and control access. Or kill it altogether? I believe encryption is only a (and not the only) necessary piece of true security."
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