Welcome Guest. | Log In | Register | Membership Benefits
Dark Reading's security-views Weblog

Topics:   Insider Threat Tech Center : Security Views
  • |   Email this page E-mail
  • |  Print Print
  • |   Bookmark and Share

Stopping Insider Attacks

There is no single thing you can do to prevent an attack from the inside. The concept of defense-in-depth applies here as it does to all areas of security. No single solution is going to make you secure. Only by putting many defense measures together will you be secure, and those measures must encompass both preventive and detective measures.

Nov 12, 2009 | 06:16 PM | 

By Eric Cole
Dark Reading
There is no single thing you can do to prevent an attack from the inside. The concept of defense-in-depth applies here as it does to all areas of security. No single solution is going to make you secure. Only by putting many defense measures together will you be secure, and those measures must encompass both preventive and detective measures.Some of the key things that can be done to prevent or minimize the damage of the insider threat are the following:

  • Security awareness. Employees, contractors, and any other insiders need to be educated on how to protect corporate assets. They need to understand the dangers and methods of social engineering and be careful what information they give out. They also have to be cognizant that insiders could exist at their companies and not only do their part to protect corporate assets (for example, locking their workstations), but they also have to look for indications of insider threats and report them to the correct parties.

  • Separation of duties. Any critical job function or access to critical information should involve two or more people. This prevents a single person from committing an inside attack.

  • Rotation of duties. All critical jobs should have multiple people who perform the roles, and those people should be rotated through periodically. If a person knows that someone else is going to be performing a given role in two months, then it will be much harder for them to commit fraud or other insider attacks because there is a good chance someone might catch it later.

  • Least privilege. Any additional access that someone has can be used against the company. Although access is needed for people to perform their jobs, this access should be carefully controlled. People should be given only the access they need to do their jobs -- and nothing else.

  • Controlled access. Access is what someone is going to use to compromise an organization. The more a company knows what access people have, the better they can control it.

  • Logging and auditing. Organizations must know what is happening on their networks, and this information must be reviewed on a regular basis. If someone's actions are not logged, then a company will have no idea who did what and will not be able to detect the insider. Even if this information is logged, if it is not reviewed on a regular basis, then an organization will not be able to catch an attacker in a timely manner.

  • Policies. A policy states what a company's stance is on security and what is expected of anyone with inside access. A policy is a mandatory document that is clear and concise and that everyone must follow. If a policy does not exist, then how do insiders know what is expected of them? I once knew an employee who bragged about making copies of software when he left a company. When I questioned his concern of legality and theft, he replied simply by saying, "I never signed anything." This information must be presented to them in a way they understand, and it must be made clear they have to follow it.

  • Defense-in-depth. When it comes to network security, there is no silver bullet. No single solution is going to make you sure. Organizations must deploy a layered security model, with checks and balances across each layer.

  • Look beyond technology. Many inside attacks are not technology-driven. Organizations must realize that nontechnology-based solutions need to be implemented across the company.

  • Archive critical data. Any critical information must be properly archived and protected. This way all the IP is not in one place should a system gets destroyed or compromised.

  • Complete solution. Any solution that is implemented must include all aspects of the company: people, data, technology, procedures, and policies.

    Dr. Eric Cole, Ph.D., is a security expert with more than 15 years of hands-on experience. Cole has experience in information technology with a focus on perimeter defense, secure network design, vulnerability discovery, penetration testing, and intrusion detection systems. He is the author of several books, including Hackers Beware, Hiding in Plain Site, Network Security Bible, and Insider Threat. He is the inventor of more than 20 patents, and is a researcher, writer, and speaker. Cole is a member of the Commission on Cyber Security for the 44th President and several executive advisory boards, and is CTO of the Americas for McAfee. Cole is involved with the SANS Technology Institute (STI) and SANS working with students, teaching, and maintaining and developing courseware. He is a SANS fellow, instructor, and course author.



  • Currently we allow the following HTML tags in comments:

    Single tags

    These tags can be used alone and don't need an ending tag.

    <br> Defines a single line break

    <hr> Defines a horizontal line

    Matching tags

    These require an ending tag - e.g. <i>italic text</i>

    <a> Defines an anchor

    <b> Defines bold text

    <big> Defines big text

    <blockquote> Defines a long quotation

    <caption> Defines a table caption

    <cite> Defines a citation

    <code> Defines computer code text

    <em> Defines emphasized text

    <fieldset> Defines a border around elements in a form

    <h1> This is heading 1

    <h2> This is heading 2

    <h3> This is heading 3

    <h4> This is heading 4

    <h5> This is heading 5

    <h6> This is heading 6

    <i> Defines italic text

    <p> Defines a paragraph

    <pre> Defines preformatted text

    <q> Defines a short quotation

    <samp> Defines sample computer code text

    <small> Defines small text

    <span> Defines a section in a document

    <s> Defines strikethrough text

    <strike> Defines strikethrough text

    <strong> Defines strong text

    <sub> Defines subscripted text

    <sup> Defines superscripted text

    <u> Defines underlined text

    Dark Reading encourages readers to engage in spirited, healthy debate, including taking us to task. However, Dark Reading moderates all comments posted to our site, and reserves the right to modify or remove any content that it determines to be derogatory, offensive, inflammatory, vulgar, irrelevant/off-topic, racist or obvious marketing/SPAM. Dark Reading further reserves the right to disable the profile of any commenter participating in said activities.

    Disqus Tips To upload an avatar photo, first complete your Disqus profile. | View the list of supported HTML tags you can use to style comments. | Please read our commenting policy.
    Subscribe to RSS









    1. Cookies, Social Media And FireSheep
    2. SMB Guide To Credit Card Regulations, Part 2: The Low-Hanging Fruit
    3. HP And The Scary Corporate Fifth Column Concept
    4. Taking USB Attacks To The Next Level
    5. NoSQL: Not Much, Anyway
    1. Taking Cybersecurity Lessons To The Bank
    2. Researchers See Real-Time Phishing Jump
    3. 'BlackSheep' Sniffs Out Firesheep WiFi-Hacking
    4. Slideshow: Ten Free Security Monitoring Tools
    5. A Different Spin On Sleuthing Stuxnet
    6. M&A Activity Muddles Database Security
    1. Secure Managed Web Hosting Saves 960.gs from Malicious Hackers
    2. Access Governance as a Business Service: An Integrated Strategy for Automation with ITSM
    3. Business Driven Access Management and Governance: Simplifying the Delivery and Governance of Access Throughout
     
     


     
      Ars Technica
    Boing Boing
    Channel 9 Forums
    CRN Blogs
    Dr.Dobb's Portal: Blogs
    Engadget
    Gizmodo
    GrokLaw
      Lifehacker
    Schneier on Security
    Slashdot
    TechCrunch
    Techdirt
    Techmeme
    Valleywag
     
      February 2012
    January 2012
    December 2011
    November 2011
    October 2011
    September 2011
    August 2011
    July 2011
    June 2011
    May 2011
    April 2011
    March 2011
    February 2011
    January 2011
    December 2010
    November 2010
    October 2010
    September 2010
    August 2010
    July 2010
    June 2010
      May 2010
    April 2010
    March 2010
    February 2010
    January 2010
    December 2009
    November 2009
    October 2009
    September 2009
    August 2009
    July 2009
    June 2009
    May 2009
    April 2009
    March 2009
    February 2009
    January 2009
    December 2008
    November 2008
    October 2008
    September 2008