Welcome Guest. | Log In| Register | Membership Benefits
Dark Reading's evil-bytes Weblog

Topics:   Evil Bytes
  • Email this page E-mail this page
  • |  Print Print this page
  • |   Bookmark and Share

Speeding Incident Response With 'Indicators' Of A Compromise

Advanced persistent threat: I like the term -- it sounds evil, and it is...well, at least I think it is. There has been a lot of news, opinions, and genuine FUD on APT since Google went public with news of its breach several weeks ago. Until then, I really don't think anyone ever paid much attention to what APT was, even though well-respected people, like Richard Bejtlich and the folks at Mandiant, have been talking about it for a while.

Feb 10, 2010 | 01:39 PM | 

By John H. Sawyer
Dark Reading
Advanced persistent threat: I like the term -- it sounds evil, and it is...well, at least I think it is. There has been a lot of news, opinions, and genuine FUD on APT since Google went public with news of its breach several weeks ago. Until then, I really don't think anyone ever paid much attention to what APT was, even though well-respected people, like Richard Bejtlich and the folks at Mandiant, have been talking about it for a while.I'd like to avoid rehashing some of the statements and arguments that people have made and look at something more interesting. Sure, some of the blogs and articles have been really good and insightful, but others were so off the mark that I wonder if they can even spell APT.

One area I've found particularly interesting is the topic of detection of these threats. I'm a big fan of actionable intelligence, and I really like the direction of Mandiant's "Indicators of Compromise," or IOCs.

Matt Frazier covered the topic of IOCs in the M-unition blog, "Combat the APT by Sharing Indicators of Compromise." He points out that the traditional distribution method of compromise data is exchanged in CSV or PDFs that are full of "known bad" information. The known bads include information like "name, size, MD5 has values and paragraphs of imprecise descriptions supplemented by ad-hoc exchanges between targets." If you've ever spent much time doing malware research, then you know exactly what he means. Gathering useful, actionable information can be painful.

Being on the frontline of fighting malware for a large network, I'm excited to see an effort to produce more actionable information in an easily digestible format (XML). From the network intrusion detection side of things, I've had many situations where events in the IDS showed a system was definitely compromised even though the antivirus product installed on the endpoint said all was well. How could IOC help?

First off, the XML could easily be processed and put into a database that could then be queried to quickly produce a one-sheet document on how to determine whether a host was indeed compromised. The sheet would show different indicators in a Boolean decision tree that a first responder could follow to confirm the compromise. That would be a much easier process than giving the first responder links to five different Web sites with varying levels of information and analysis that they'll have to weed through to figure out what's relevant to this particular case.

I'm getting a little ahead of myself since the details and tools of IOC haven't been published to the M-unition blog yet, but it sounds promising. Since it sounds like it's going to be relatively open and accessible for anyone to use, I can envision tying it in with the Emerging Threats Snort ruleset. Snort rules have a "reference" field that could point to the unique ID of a specific IOC to make it easier for detecting the compromise at the host level. Ah...and a security pro can wish, right?

Mandiant's Intelligent Response product is very impressive, and the company has produced some incredibly powerful free tools (i.e.m Memoryze & Audit Viewer), so I expect good things to come from its Indicators of Compromise effort. Keep an eye on the M-unition blog for more info, and I'll post more about my testing as the tools and IOCs are released.

John H. Sawyer is a senior security engineer on the IT Security Team at the University of Florida. The views and opinions expressed in this blog are his own and do not represent the views and opinions of the UF IT Security Team or the University of Florida. When John's not fighting flaming, malware-infested machines or performing autopsies on blitzed boxes, he can usually be found hanging with his family, bouncing a baby on one knee and balancing a laptop on the other. Special to Dark Reading.



Currently we allow the following HTML tags in comments:

Single tags

These tags can be used alone and don't need an ending tag.

<br> Defines a single line break

<hr> Defines a horizontal line

Matching tags

These require an ending tag - e.g. <i>italic text</i>

<a> Defines an anchor

<b> Defines bold text

<big> Defines big text

<blockquote> Defines a long quotation

<caption> Defines a table caption

<cite> Defines a citation

<code> Defines computer code text

<em> Defines emphasized text

<fieldset> Defines a border around elements in a form

<h1> This is heading 1

<h2> This is heading 2

<h3> This is heading 3

<h4> This is heading 4

<h5> This is heading 5

<h6> This is heading 6

<i> Defines italic text

<p> Defines a paragraph

<pre> Defines preformatted text

<q> Defines a short quotation

<samp> Defines sample computer code text

<small> Defines small text

<span> Defines a section in a document

<s> Defines strikethrough text

<strike> Defines strikethrough text

<strong> Defines strong text

<sub> Defines subscripted text

<sup> Defines superscripted text

<u> Defines underlined text

Dark Reading encourages readers to engage in spirited, healthy debate, including taking us to task. However, Dark Reading moderates all comments posted to our site, and reserves the right to modify or remove any content that it determines to be derogatory, offensive, inflammatory, vulgar, irrelevant/off-topic, racist or obvious marketing/SPAM. Dark Reading further reserves the right to disable the profile of any commenter participating in said activities.

Disqus Tips To upload an avatar photo, first complete your Disqus profile. | View the list of supported HTML tags you can use to style comments. | Please read our commenting policy.
Subscribe to RSS









  1. Cookies, Social Media And FireSheep
  2. SMB Guide To Credit Card Regulations, Part 2: The Low-Hanging Fruit
  3. HP And The Scary Corporate Fifth Column Concept
  4. Taking USB Attacks To The Next Level
  5. NoSQL: Not Much, Anyway
  1. Taking Cybersecurity Lessons To The Bank
  2. Researchers See Real-Time Phishing Jump
  3. 'BlackSheep' Sniffs Out Firesheep WiFi-Hacking
  4. Slideshow: Ten Free Security Monitoring Tools
  5. A Different Spin On Sleuthing Stuxnet
  6. M&A Activity Muddles Database Security
  1. Secure Managed Web Hosting Saves 960.gs from Malicious Hackers
  2. Access Governance as a Business Service: An Integrated Strategy for Automation with ITSM
  3. Business Driven Access Management and Governance: Simplifying the Delivery and Governance of Access Throughout
 
 


 
  Ars Technica
Boing Boing
Channel 9 Forums
CRN Blogs
Dr.Dobb's Portal: Blogs
Engadget
Gizmodo
GrokLaw
  Lifehacker
Schneier on Security
Slashdot
TechCrunch
Techdirt
Techmeme
Valleywag
 
  February 2012
January 2012
December 2011
November 2011
October 2011
September 2011
August 2011
July 2011
June 2011
May 2011
April 2011
March 2011
February 2011
January 2011
December 2010
November 2010
October 2010
September 2010
August 2010
July 2010
June 2010
  May 2010
April 2010
March 2010
February 2010
January 2010
December 2009
November 2009
October 2009
September 2009
August 2009
July 2009
June 2009
May 2009
April 2009
March 2009
February 2009
January 2009
December 2008
November 2008
October 2008
September 2008